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Tuomas Toivonen
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Sat, 10 May 2008
Hezbollah communications network as a "lifesaver" - what utter nonsense!
Read an article on Electronic Intifada's Lebanon coverage analyzing the current situation. And I must say I am appalled. I am so squarely in the March 14 camp that this quote from the article simple ruffles my feathers.
"Given this context it is clear why Hizballah, as expressed by a press conference given by Hassan Nasrallah this week, was outraged by the government's decision to attempt to dismantle this telecommunications network, that without a doubt assisted in saving Lebanese lives during the 2006 Israeli attack."
Granted the HA wouldn't be the world's premier guerrilla force if they didn't make use of technology extensively and the communications network surely is a core component of their arsenal. But I can't believe that such historical revisionism as evident in the above quote can be put forward. How about the HA not starting the war in the first place? There is nothing that would have saved more lives - not to mention property and overall well-being of the Lebanese civilians.
Yes, there is no shortage of valid criticism of both the March 14 and the Israelis (and of lumping them together for this sentence) but to blame anyone else than the HA for instigating the July 2006 war is simply wrong. And yes, the network may have stopped a full scale Israeli invasion and occupation up to the Litani river, but it still doesn't make the quote right. The HA started it and they're the ones responsible.
Fri, 09 May 2008Having been very busy the last couple of days I completely missed the events in Beirut until checking my blog feeds late last night. Call me naive, but I had not expected events to come to this. Perhaps I had been lulled at thinking the never ending crisis to elect a president would simply continue. And that the Hariri tribunal would somehow be a positive force in breaking the gridlock. Naturally that was not to be.
Nevertheless the latest events simply feel very surreal. I am ashamed to admit, but part of the charm of Beirut for me has always been its tumultuous past. Having the odd derelict building and having walls pockmarked by bullets is romantic in a way, but only if you can believe that its what has been and that now it is different, that the future (no pun intended) is bright. When I visited Lebanon after the July 2006 war a lot of that "charm" wasn't there anymore: the war had become real. And even more now reading that yesterday Hamra Street had become one of the battle lines with Hariri militia on one side and the HA and Amal on the other. With my regular haunt, the Hotel Mayflower, a couple of blocks on the then-Hariri side of Hamra Street, I had hard time believing the events. This morning, of course, the news reports were that the HA have overrun West Beirut and that, according to some reports, they are taking control of many government offices.
What I find even more unreal is the speed at which Beirutis in the contested areas adapted to old habits of survival during urban warfare. Bloggers wrote about discussing the militia movements and locations of snipers on Facebook's chat. A lot of the blog posts reminded me of Jean Said Makdisi's book "Beirut Fragments: A War Memoir". Not as dramatic as e.g. the siege of West Beirut in 1982, but it is one thing to read a book about events twenty five years in the past and then reading about similar events being blogged more or less as they happen.
Hopefully there is a way out of the crisis. Not that I see one though. The HA have effected a Gaza in West Beirut and have little interest in seeing it reversed now that it is fait accompli. Rather their interest is to leverage the new status quo to elect a president and institute a government on their terms. Effectively this is a huge win for the Syrian regime and overall I would have to think a fatal blow for the tribunal. Assad couldn't break Lebanon over Hariri Sr. and Jumblatt's heads, but with the HA he is doing exactly that with Beirut and Hariri Jr. At the moment it seems that the LF and Phalange are reluctant to step in and help their March 14 compatriots. And the HA are doing what they can to not provoke them. Aoun, of course, is most pleased. No, I really can't see a way out. Every escalation since the July 2006 war has pushed up the ante in the HA's favor. Ans they've kept at it steadily. Ultimately it is Lebanon as a proxy in regional conflicts all over again.
Tue, 06 May 2008
Watching Clannad and Robin of Sherwood on the Tube
Late night at the office again. Excel fun doing an expenses invoice. Always a chore but a pleasant one: there is certainly profit in retrieving money for all those Facebook ads, domain names and what not paid with personal credit card.
Watching some Robin of Sherwood themed fan videos of Clannad songs. Excellent stuff. Probably only Star Trek: The Next Generation (or early Deep Space Nine or Babylon Five) ranks as high as Robin of Sherwood for me. Was totally hooked on the series back in something like mid-80s when they used to show it on Finnish TV during summers.
Saw Clannad last Saturday. First time they were here in Helsinki. A superb performance. Really glad I went to the concert. The set was pretty close to what's on the 1996 "Live in Concert" record, but that was fine: at least I could recognize most of the songs. Earlier in the week there was another stellar concert. This time by the chamber choir of the university music association. The venue was the entry hall of the national library and the theme medieval. Especially enjoyed the 14th and 15th century Spanish works, including one set in Quechua by an anonymous native Andean composer. The library as a setting was interesting: the concert started with the choir spread along the shelves on the balcony encircling the hall. The space was well used with the choir members switching locations between every couple of songs.
Oh well, back to work and listening to Fisk Industries. Couldn't get Scred Connexion on Emusic.
Update: A more extensive post on my brother's blog on the Clannad concert (in Finnish). Thanks Stibe and Tebu for a wonderful birthday present!
Mon, 14 Apr 2008
Another Finnish startup (Tripsay) featured on Techcrunch
Another fourteen hours at the office (though I did skip to the university for a pair of those). Busy ironing out some remaining issues from a major feature release to Scred. Couldn't get things wrapped out today so we'll probably end up releasing two days later than planned, but that's not too bad.
Good to have spring round the corner. With summer time already it seems that the birds are up and awake at three thirty am. Nice to listen to blackbirds calling to each other while walking from the office to the car. Driving home listened to Philip Glass: Symphony No. 3. But with still running on winter tyres the acoustics were not quite up to it. Switched to Bassoradio instead.
Earlier tonight another Finnish company, Tripsay, was featured on Techcrunch. Apparently they ran out of the two hundred beta invitation tokens released through Techcrunch real quick. Good to see their service featured and received such a lot of interest from the public. Seems like the "travel 2.0" scene is rather hot these days. Lots of companies but no definitive solutions yet. With Lonely Planet having a bit of crisis due to reports that some of their South American guidebooks had less than perfectly verified information, there's certainly an opening for alternative channels distributing travel tips. Remains to be seen how well user generated content will work for travel. With Tripsay I am quite looking forward to their destination recommendation service, but at the moment they need more users willing to generate content. For example, it doesn't help very much that I am one of the only users rating locations around the Levant. But then again, their still in closed beta.
P.S. The approach we pioneered at The Next Web seems to be killer. With a Dutch lunch consisting of a measly sandwich or two, why bother, and especially why bother queuing. First day of Next Web we ended using first half of the lunch break talking to Erick from Techcrunch. And (to our suprise) we ended up being featured later that day. Come Next Web day two Tripsay used the same approach to similar good effect. :-)
Thu, 03 Apr 2008Okay. Party time. We went over another 2^n milestone with the number of registered Scred users. Day on day growth at 13.5%. Really unbelievable. Best day ever. Well - thank you Next Web. Glad we decided to attend. Still can't believe it. What magic did we do?
Mixed blessing though. been a 16h conference day and I am really truly beat. Several severely sleep deprived nights working on the next Scred release are starting to show. But mixed blessing: a lot of user feedback to respond to. But that is quite okay. Morcheeba is playing at the lobby bar of the Hotel de Filosoof. A nice cold beer. Catching up on things back home and mail. One thing to gripe about Next Web so far: the wifi has been abysmal. Like there's effectively not been one.
And oh: Hotel de Filosoof. What a wonderful little three star place. Each room is themed after a philosopher. We're camped at the Confucius room. With Taoist sayings painted on the walls. Very soothing.
P.S. So why the growth? Techcrunched.
Sat, 08 Mar 2008Day two of Startup Camp was consisted of two more hours of unconference sessions. I went to one where the topic was leveraging social networks. Somewhat interesting, but not really that valuable. The focus was on how you leverage business oriented social networks such as LinkedIn or Ecademy to build your professional reputation and network. That has certain value, but personally I am more interested in the consumer oriented sites and their potential as a platform for distributing and syndicating Scred, and also for providing access to the kinds of communities that we are servicing with Scred. Another thing with all those business networking sites (and the consumer ones as well) is that social network portability is urgently needed. Later today I filled in my profile at YouNoodle. What for, really, I don't know. One more site where I've manually entered my CV, qualifications and interests. What we need and data portability efforts may ultimately achieve, is a sort of social multigraph. You need to be able to connect to the same people over multiple channels no matter where they're listed.
The other unconference session I attended today was about "cool things": useful web-based services, mashups and all that. Kind of interesting but I wasn't paying too much attention (being occupied with finding out how to get to Luton in a few hours ... this is where my laptop run out of battery and I switched to reading an Iain Banks novel - it was Scotland I was flying to after all).
Arrived in Glasgow. My brother's place has a nice view over the city, but this being Saturday night and right in the center of the city, well, it is kind of noisy down on the street. No matter though. Feeling plenty tired after Startup Camp so time to sleep. Glad we went there. Loads of good feedback and lots of work to be done in refining our pitch.
Fri, 07 Mar 2008Been an interesting and worthwhile first day at the Startup Camp. I'm glad we decided to come over here. This being my first "unconference" I didn't really know what to expect, but so far the experience has been positive. Basically what happens at an uncoference is whatever the attendees bring to the table, so to speak. After a couple of keynote speakers (David Axmark of MySQL and Steve Garnet of Salesforce.com) there was a session to set the agenda for the rest of the conference. Anyone was free to suggest a topic for a one hour slots and there were several parallel tracks running. The person suggesting the topic then acted as a moderator for that session. What was especially good that people who were not experts themselves could suggest topics. Like someone could say that "I'm having problems in my startup with xyz, is there an expert in xyz?" It was easy then for people to volunteer to chair a session as there was a clear demand for expertise.
Perhaps the most rewarding - or at anyrate, the funniest - session I attended was on raising venture capital. The chair was a Finnish guy. We knew that apart from us there was supposed to be a Finn at the conference from a mobile video streaming company Floobs. So even though the session chair wasn't the fellow named in the roster as coming from Floobs I assumed that they'd simply sent someone else. During the session then I was quite of wondering: why did they raise first round of funding in London? I mean, they're a Finnish company after all, based in Helsinki. I was about to ask him why they zoomed on UK-based VCs right away, but confirmed first that you're based in Helsinki, Finland, right? And you're from a company called Floobs? And he was like, um, no and no. Okay, fair enough, but what actually makes this funny is that earlier on he'd talked about how his startup is doing video streaming and that they have mobile applications for that. Exactly what a fellow from Floobs would say. He'd also said how they first focused on the entertainment space, but then moved more on to security applications. And there I was, thinking, seems like Floobs has changed direction since I last talked to some of their people a week ago. Already I was wondering what they were now called. I mean, being called Floobs and doing sort of "mobile CCTV" doesn't quite mix. Oh well. And for what Floobs is doing, and that's in the entertainment space still, their name is catchy enough.
Thu, 06 Mar 2008
En route to Startup Camp in London
Writing on a Blue1 flight from Helsinki to London Stansted. We're heading with Setok to Startup Camp, a two day event sponsored by Sun and MySQL (well, Sun and Sun). Friday morning there'll be couple of hours of "startup university" with speakers from some of the sponsoring companies. Friday afternoon and Saturday will be an "unconference" in the {Foo,Bar}Camp format. The agenda - as is to be expected - was still wide open when I last checked yesterday, but it should prove interesting. Last count was that there will be about four hundred attendees: most people from early stage startups that have either recently launched or are still in pre-launch development. Some media folks (Mashable is one of the sponsors) will be there too and a couple of VCs. What we most hope to get out of the conference is basically to talk about Scred to hone our pitch and get feedback on the various ideas we've been developing for Scred that are still three to six months out. We're also looking for potential partners that would fit our Scred distribution strategy that we've been actively developing since our public launch last month.
At least I am (and I think I can speak for the whole team) rather excited about how well the Scred effort has been going. Last time around (2001-2002) when we were doing a startup kind of thing (the Nodnol project) we tanked before we could launch the product. I can't claim that we've done everything right this time, but we've done so many thinks a whole lot better. We have a product on the market and real users. We have less code and less technology done than we had with Nodnol, but the release early, release often model is something that we should have done then too. Instead we built the server side and the client side on no less than three mobile platforms (Palm, Pocket PC and the Nokia Communicator - the three big platforms from a Scandinavian smartphone and/or PDA perspective). We had the prototypes done and everything more or less worked. And the GUIs and content were described wholly on the server in a platform independent manner. Very cool, but also very stupid from a bandwidth utilization perspective. I've been drafting a longer post on what Nodnol was all about, what went wrong and why, but that will have to wait until after the Startupcamp.
Oh, and Nodnol, that's London in reverse, how very appropriate considering where headed. And why Nodnol, well, that's an episode from Red Dwarf where everything happened in reverse, time running in the opposite direction or something like that. Haven't seen it in a while. Can't even remember why we picked it. But it's an episode from a sci-fi series, like our release code names for Scred. Some continuity there then, at least.
Sat, 01 Mar 2008
Kolme vuotta Haririn salamurhasta
Ystävänpäivästä ja Rafik Haririn murhan kolmannesta vuosipäivästä on kulunut jo pari viikkoa. En ole muilta kiireiltäni ehtinyt sitä blogikirjoittelun merkeissä kunnolla muistamaan. Varsinaisena vuosipäivänä istuin Invalidisäätiön sairaalassa odottelemassa sormileikkausta (vanha lainelautailuvamma) ja luin Augustus Richard Nortonin kirjaa Hezbollah: A Short History. Hizbollahin "ulkomaisten operaatioiden päällikkö" Imad Mughniyeh oli aiemmin viikolla pommitettu Damaskoksessa.
Asiaan. Carnegie Endowement for Peace julkaisi viime kuussa raportin "The New Middle East". Joshua Landis blogissaan kehuu raporttia, Tony Badran sen sijaan suhtautuu kaikkea muuta kuin myötämielisesti raportin Syyriaa ja Libanonia käsittelevään lukuun. Ei erityisen yllättävää. Samaten vähemmän yllättäää, että oma näkemykseni on huomattavasti lähempänä Badranin näkökantaa. Muutamia huomioita.
Carnegien raportti lienee oikeassa huomauttaessaan, että Yhdysvaltain Syyrian vastainen politiikka muodostui Irakin sodan jälkimainingeissa. Syyria koki sodan ja sitä seuranneen Irakin miehityksen uhkana ja toimi totutun ja ilmeisen toimivaksi havaitun tavan mukaisesti, ts. Syyria avoimesti tuki vastarintaliikettä Irakissa kuten on tehnyt vuosikymmenet Libanonissa ja myös tukiessaan palestiinalaisia äärijärjestöjä. Syyrian hankaloittaessa Yhdysvaltain toimia Irakissa oli Yhdysvaltain vaikea edelleen tukea Syyrian roolia Libanonissa. Vaikka Yhdysvaltain tuki Libanonin demokratialle voidaan näin nähdä vähemmän pyyteettömänä on silti huomioitava Libanonissa syksyllä 2004 tiivistynyt vastustus Syyrian siirtomaavallan jatkumiselle. Haririn murhaan suoraan johtanut Syyrian vastaisuus oli Libanonissa sisäsyntyistä. Länsimaiden tuki seetrivallankumoukselle Haririn murhan jälkeen oli opportunistista, ei käynnistävässä roolissa. Näin ollen Yhdysvaltain Libanonin demokratiaa tukeva politiikka sai muotonsa vasta Haririn murhan jälkeen ja seetrivallankumouksen myötä.
Carnegien raportti myös toteaa, että keväällä 2005 järjestetyt Libanonin parlamenttivaalit toteutettiin vanhan, Syyrian saneleman vaalilain mukaisesti. Raportti käyttää tätä argumenttina epäillessään vaalit voittaneen March 14 -liittouman oikeutusta enemmistöön parlamentissa. En yksinkertaisesti ymmärrä väitettä. Miten parlamentin opposition toimet olisivat sen demokraattisempia? Päinvastoin: ministerien eri syksyllä 2006 ja sen perusteella vaatimus veto-oikeudesta hallituksessa; yli vuoden kestänyt Beirutin ydinkeskustassa telttaleiriä pitänyt mielenosoitus; presidentinvaalien sabotointi ja uuden presidentin valinnan ehdollistaminen uuden hallituksen valintaan, jossa oppositiolla veto-oikeus; ja kaiken huippuna tietysti Hizbollahin kesällä 2006 yksipuoleisesti aloittama sota Israelia vastaan. Vaikka nykyinen hallitus koostuukin mm. Samir Geagean ja Walid Jumblattin kaltaisista uskonnollisia ryhmittymiä edustavista sotalordeista ja Haririn klaanin oligarkeista on se silti vaalit rehdisti voittanut enemmistö ja on (toki enemmistönä se on helpompaa) toiminut näennäisen demokraattisesti.
Pari päivää siten kirjoittamassaan blogipostissa Landis toteaa anonyymisti syyrialaisviranomaisia lainaten: "Lebanon is no longer a card that Syria can play in the region. It is a card that is being used against us. We have no choice but to neutralizing it." Uskomatonta, kerrassaan. Avoimen propagandista roskaa, imho. Kannattiko aloittaa syksyllä 2004 autopommikampanja Libanonissa? Kenties hieman yllättäen se johti ylikansallisen tutkimusryhmän perustamiseen YK-mandaatilla ja rikokset käsittelevän kansainvälisen oikeusistuimen saattamiseen voimaan. Haririn murhatutkimusten saattaminen päätökseensä ei ole anti-Syyria -kortin pelaamista vaan yksinkertaisesti välttämättömyys.
Landis jatkaa lainaustaan: "Syria has no interest in hurting Lebanon or 'burning' it, as some claim. It is in Syria's interest to have a prosperous Lebanon as we demonstrated in 1990s." Uskoamatonta, kerrassaan. Syyrian avoin hegemonia Libanonissa 1990-2005 oli todellisen roistovaltion aikaa. Roistovaltion siinä mielessä, että Syyrian poliittinen ja sotilaallinen eliitti ryösti Libanonin varallisuutta mielinmäärin. Landisin omaa kommentaaria: "Syria and its Lebanese allies have no intention of abandoning the Lebanese government to Saad Hariri, Jumblat, and Geagea. They believe that they have the better position from which to wage the economic war that will surely decide the fate of both Lebanese and Syrians." Taloudellista sotaapa hyvinkin. Kun Libanonin vauraus ei ole enää Syyrian ryöstettävissä, on sopiva aika käydä taloudellista sotaa. Syyrian regiimi kokee Haririn murhatutkimukset itselleen eksistentiaaliseksi uhaksi ja siinä pelissa Libanonin kansantalous on muitta mutkitta uhrattavissa oleva nappula. Libanonia ei täydy konkreettisesti polttaa (no, autopommeja lukuunottamatta), mutta sen talouden kyllä saa tuhota.
En ymmärrä, miksi Landis lainaa täysin kritiikittömästi syyrialaisviranomaisten propagandaa vaikka itsekin toteaa (näiden väitteiden vastaisesti) Syyrian käydän taloussotaa ja toimivan Libanonin vastaisesti.
Vaan eiköhän tämä tältä erää Libanonin puolustukseksi ja Syyrian vastaisuutena. Kuten lienen aiemminkin todennut ei minulla ole mitään sinällään Syyriaa ja vielä vähemmän syyrialaisia vastaan, mutta Syyrian valtiokoneisto sortaa sekä kansalaisiaan että Libanonin enemmistöä kestämättömällä tavalla. Olisi varmaan kesällä käytävä Libanonissa tukemassa maan taloudelle kriittistä turismia, jonka erinomaiselta näyttäneen sesongin Hizbollah meni toissakesänä tuhoamaan.
Mon, 12 Nov 2007
amazon.{co.uk,com} and the cheap dollar
In the latest Foreign Affairs Francis Fukuyama reviewed "Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul", a book by Michael Reid, a Latin America correspondent for The Economist. Inspired by Fukuyama's review and Reid's supposedly pragmatic take on structural reform (or neoliberalism, if you prefer) in Latin America, I decided to put in an order with Amazon.
But, the dollar being as cheap as it is, the eternal question presented itself once more: which Amazon - the .co.uk or .com variant? I also decided to order one another book and this time really compare the prices. Let's see. (Rates GBP:EUR 1.4262 and USD:EUR 0.6817.)
Deborah J. Yashar: "Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge" (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Prices: amazon.co.uk GBP 23.74 (33.86 EUR) and amazon.com USD 27.69 (18.88 EUR).
Michael Reid: "Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul" (Yale University Press, 2007). Prices: amazon.co.uk GBP 18.99 (EUR 27.08) and amazon.com USD 19.80 (EUR 13.50).
Shipping and handling: amazon.co.uk GBP 5.97 (EUR 8.51) and amazon.com USD 11.97 (EUR 8.16). Taxes: amazon.co.uk GBP 3.90 (EUR 5.56) and amazon.com USD 0.00 (EUR 0.00).
So, what's the total price? From amazon.co.uk GBP 52.60 (EUR 75.01) and amazon.com USD 59.66 (EUR 40.67). Whoa, that's just insane. I'll save roughly 48% by having my books shipped across the Atlantic. Of course it'll take something like 2-4 weeks from amazon.com, compared to 1-2 weeks from amazon.co.uk. And unfortunately Reid's book won't be available until January in the US so I'll run the risk of the dollar appreciating meanwhile as Amazon only charges the order when it ships.
Nevertheless, I ended ordering from amazon.com. And also indulged my shopaholism by ordering Teivo Teivainen's "Enter Economism, Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Political" (Zed Books, 2002). The book was available via Amazon as second hand from "bargainbooks" at the insane price of $0.01! Well, shipping and handling came at about $12, but still a bargain.
Sun, 30 Sep 2007Watched Syriana today with a bunch of friends. First saw it in the theaters and had wanted to see it again. And, yes, it was as good as I remembered. Extremely dispiriting, but very true. Everybody loses, except some of the bad guys and, of course, the American consumer. (Not that I wouldn't share some of the blame having done 40 km at something like 13 litres per 100 km to drive to the friend's place and back to see the movie.)
If you haven't seen Syriana yet, do so. As a movie it doesn't for me rate as highly as Traffic (some of the same people, similar approach, different theme), but having spent my time in the Middle East, I can relate to Syriana more easily. Especially, it always makes me want to visit Beirut again, and for some reason, to travel to Iran.
Doesn't surprise me at all that some of the scenes in Syriana were sensored before it was shown in, e.g. Dubai. If that doesn't surprise you, then read "Fear and Money in Dubai" by Mike Davis (New Left Review 41, Sept-Oct 2006). Not that I've ever been to Dubai, but Doha, Qatar comes close enough, and somehow the anonymous Persian Gulf emirate portrayed in Syriana kept making me think of Qatar (though they're not running out of hydrocarbons anytime soon).
So, الحمد لله, we have our forests (carbon) and lakes (hydrogen) here in Finland. Hydrocarbons, anyone? Oil and gas? No thanks. (Russian imports? Oh yeah, yes please.)
P.S. The Norwegians though seem to be doing fine with their hydrocarbons, and, um, fish. Highest GDP per capita in Scandinavia, and the least hours worked per week. Need to work overtime? No problem: free whale steak for dinner at company expense! ;-)
Fri, 14 Sep 2007
Libanon ja Syyria, Badran ja Landis
Kuuntelin eilen illalla kotimatkalla radio-ohjelman jälkilähetyksen (podcastin, siis), jossa Joshua Landis (Syria Comment) ja Tony Badran (Across the Bay) väänsivät kättä Yhdysvaltain ja Syyrian suhteista. Landisin ja erityisesti Badranin tuntien keskustelu pyöri Libanonin ympärillä. Kuten blogissaankin oli Badranilla kova tarve diskreditoida Landis, osoittaa tämä syyriamieliseksi hännystelijäksi. Landis puolestaan pyrki olemaan oikein asiallinen ja "aikuismainen" vaikka joutuikin muutamaan otteeseen pahasti puolustuskannalle. Mielenkiintoista oli kuitenkin kuulla Landisin ja Badranin keskustelevan muuallakin kuin blogeissaan.
Seuraavassa muutamia kommentteja keskustelun herättämänä. Todettakoon kuitenkin heti alkuun, että oma mielipiteeni on hyvin "badranilainen", pidän Syyriaa tällä hetkellä suurimpana uhkana Libanonin vakaudelle ja koen henkilökohtaisesti alueellisesti tärkeämpänä "pelastamisen" kuin esimerkiksi Libanonin uhraamisen Irakin vakauttamiseksi (ts. "ei neuvotteluille Syyrian kanssa").
Olisiko Syyrian kanssa neuvoteltava? Kuten Landis totesi, Syyrian ei täydy olla Yhdysvaltain vihollinen ja Yhdysvallat on Irakin toimillaan ja Syyriaa painostamalla katalysoinut vihanpidon. Landisilla on pointtinsa, mutta itse suhtaudun aavistuksen verran kriittisesti Basharin Assadin kykyyn tehdä kompromisseja. Basharin politiikka on osoittatunut vähemmän käytännölliseksi ja pitkäjännitteiseksi kuin isä-Assadin.
Neuvoteltava mistä Syyrian kanssa mistä? Landis painotti vastavuoroisuutta. Mitä annettavaa Syyrialla on? Syyria kenties kykenisi auttamaan Irakin vakauttamisessa. On selvä, että valtaosa "ulkomaalaistaistelijoista" kuitenkin kulkee Irakiin Syyrian kautta - ja osittain Syyrian hiljaisella suostumuksella. Silti shiiojen ja sunnien välisessä laajemmassa konfliktissa Syyrian vaikutusmahdollisuudet ovat heikot, ja Iraniin verrattuna mitättömät. Syyrialle Irakin pakolaiset ovat olleet tähän mennessä eduksi. Landisin lukujen mukaan pakolaisia on jo puolitoista miljoonaa. Badran lainasi IMF:n tuoretta raporttia, jonka mukaan valtosa Syyrian talouskasvusta viimeisen kolmen vuoden aikana on tullut irakilaisten pakolaisten mukanaan tuoman varallisuuden kautta. Aiemmin tällä viikolla Syyria kuitenkin totesi vaativansa jatkossa viisumin irakilaisilta. Kenties pakolaisten "laatu" on nyttemmin heikennyt ja keskiluokkaisia, Syyrian talouden kannalta edullisia pakolaisia ei enää samoissa määrin saavu, ts. kaikki, joiden on ollut suhteellisen helppo lähteä Irakista ovat jo lähteneet. Toisaalta on myönnettävä, että pakolaisten virta Syyriaan on ollut ongelmallista: terveys- ja koulutuspalvelut ovat ylikuormitettuja ja irakilaisten majoittamisen aiheuttama kiinteistöjen hintojen nousu aiheuttaa närää tavallisissa syyrialaisissa.
Rauha Israelin kanssa voisi palattaa Golanin Syyrialle. Mutta se tarkoittaisi, että Syyrian olisi alettava käyttäytyä asiallisesti. Ei enää terrorismin tukemista. Erityisesti tuki rejektionistisille palestiinalaisjärjestöille olisi lakkautettava, siis toimistot Damaskoksessa sulki, ei enää aseistamista tai harjoitusleiriä Syyriassa. Tuen Hamasille olisi lakattava, samoin PFLP-GC. Syyrian olisi myös de facto vetäydyttävä Libanonista. Israelin kanssa rauhan tehnyt Syyria ei voisi enää tukea Hizbollahia. Se taas puolestaan tarkoittaisi, että Syyria menettäisin keskeisen tuen tavoitteilleen Libanonissa. Välirikko Hizbollahin kanssa ja yleisemmin rauha Israelin kanssa olisi myös ongelmallista Syyrian ja Iranin liitossa. Ahmadinejadin kauden uudelleen äärimmäistynyt Iran jäisi yksin rejektionististen palestiinalaisten tukijaksi.
En voi uskoa, että Syyria olisi valmis luopumaan terroristaan, liitosta Iranin kanssa ja erityisesti Libanonista. Rauha Israelin kanssa tarkoittaisi Syyrialle selkeää marginalisoitumista. Ilman Libanonia Syyria ei ole alueellisesti merkittävä toimija. Samaten terrori tai sen uhka pitävät Syyrian jatkuvasti mukana laskelmissa pohdittaessa alueellista tilannetta. Rauhan tehnyt Syyria olisi non-entiteetti, joka kenties toimisi alueellisesti vakauttavana tekijänä, mutta tuskin silti poistaisi Hizbollahin tai rejektionististen palestiinalaisjärjestöjen Israeliin kohdistamaa uhkaa. Käytännössä Israelin hyödyt rauhasta Syyrian kanssa olisivat ehkä vähemmän merkittävät kuin usein annetaan ymmärtää.
Sisäpoliittisesti rauha Israelin kanssa olisi myös Syyrialle ongelmallista. Kiinnostavasti käydessäni Damaskoksessa elokuussa oli tunnelma kovasti aggressiivisempi kuin aiemmin. Tai ehkä tunnelma on liian voimakas ilmaus, mutta valtion tuottama ikonografia oli militantimpaa. Sekä tietysti Basharista oli saatu uudet, vielä entistä mahtipontisemmat potretit, ilmeisesti toukukuun presidentinvaaleissa saavutetun uudelleenvalinnan kunniaksi. Rauha Israelin kanssa poistaisi Syyrian regiimiltä yhden sen tärkeimmistä oikeutuksista. Kehno taloudellinen tila ei enää olisi kansalaisille selitettävissä sotatilalla.
Keskeisintä nähdäkseni kuitenkin neuvoteltaessa Syyrian kanssa on kysymys Libanonin tulevaisuudesta. Kuten Badran on usein todennut Golan on Syyrialle taloudellisesti merkityksetön. Libanon sen sijaan melkeinpä elintärkeä. Syyrialla ei ole mitään syytä neuvotella elleivät neuvottelukumppanit (siis kansainvälinen yhteisö) ole ensin valmiit luopumaan Hariri-oikeudenkäynnistä ja sitten palauttemaan Libanonin hallintaa Syyrian turvallisuuspalveluille ja sitä kautta Syyrien regiimin taloudellisia intressejä Libanonissa. Syyria ei ole millään tavalla ilmaissut valmiuttaan hellittää Libanonista ja esimerkiksi luoda maiden välille normaalit diplomaattisuhteet. Siksi Syyrian kanssa ei voi neuvotella. Muuten päädyttäisiin samaan tilanteeseen kuin vuosien 1990 ja 2005 välillä. Syyrian ei voi antaa uudelleen tukahduttaa Libanonia henkisesti ja taloudellisesti. Enkä usko, että Libanonin tilanne olisi tällä hetkellä näin kärjistynyt mikäli Syyria olisi vetäytynyt Libanonista aiemmin.
Wed, 04 Apr 2007
Reflections on Bolivia's plan to nationalize Entel
On Monday, April 2, 2007, the Bolivian government promulgated presidential decree (Decreto Supremo) 29087. According to the decree, a commission is to be formed to negotiate the return to state control of Entel, the ex-Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, or national telephone company [3, 4]. Last year on Labour Day, the Bolivian president Evo Morales announced the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. With the commission formed on Monday having a thirty day mandate, we can expect Morales to have another labour Day show, this time with completion of Entel's nationalization.
Capitalizations
As with hydrocarbons, nationalization is a somewhat misleading term. Rather the Morales administration appears to be intent on returning a controlling interest in Entel to the state, i.e. reversing the ideologically loathed privatization process of the mid-1990s.
During the administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997) Bolivia privatized state owned enterprises (SOE) in a process known as capitalization. A case of traditional privatization entails the sale of partial or full interest in a SOE to private sector interests. Proceeds of the sale enter the state coffers. In contrast the Bolivian capitalization process entailed the sale of a fifty percent stake in each SOE to strategic investors. Nothing was paid to the government. Instead the strategic investor committed to an investment schedule that was supposed to boost the performance of the ex-SOE by bringing in capital (and, of course, managerial talent). At the same time two pension funds (AFPs or Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) were created. Little under half the shares in the capitalized companies were transferred to the AFPs with the intention of funding the Bonosol, an annual entitlement to all Bolivians over 65. Few percent of the shares were distributed to employees of the ex-SOEs. Besides the AFPs and associated pension reform, the capitalization process created regulatory agencies were in each of sector with capitalized SOEs. For telecommunications the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones de Bolivia was established [6].
Capitalization of Entel took place in 1996. Fifty percent was sold to Stet International, a company that later merged with Telecom Italia. Employees were distributed three percent of the shares and the rest (47%) were lodged with the two AFPs. In exchange for its share Stet committed to capitalizing Entel with $608m over four years.
Entel post-capitalization
A statement [1] on Tuesday by administration stated that no jobs would be lost due to the nationalization. Concluding the statement are misdemeanors supposedly committed by Entel that seem to serve as a partial rationale for the nationalization. An investigation by the telecommunications regulator and a ministry are said to have found "indications of irregularities in the administration and operations of Entel that affect the company's financial investments and attempts at the national tax regime".
In their recent book "Impasse Bolivia" [2] Kohl & Farthing claim that pre-capitalization Entel was one of the best managed SOEs and the second most profitable. After taking over, the Italians brough in new management, streamlined the workforce, and started an ambitious investment program to fulfil the over $600m in commitments. Cellular service was expanded and fiber optic connections to Brazil and Chile established. Revenue growth at Entel has been strong, but profits weaker than expected. Accusations have been levelled of Entel shifting profits to overseas subsidiaries as a means of tax evasion; full repartiation of profits of the capitalized companies is otherwise allowed. Weak financial transparency and regulatory control have undermined investor confidence and Entel's stock price has at times been lower than existing cash reserves. [Note 1]
Despite telecommunications deregulation in Bolivia, Entel remains the dominant operator in all sectors. Reports [3, 4] vary, but Entel is claimed to hold 68% to 80% of the long distance market, 67% to 70% of the cellular market and 90% of the Internet market.
Whether nationalization of Entel makes sense or not remains to be seen. Most likely the Morales administration is using the supposed misdeeds of Entel to push for a best possible deal with Telecom Italia (TI). According to reports [4, 7], the TI has valued its stake in Entel at $170m. Also, TI is supposedly willing to sell and doesn't consider its stake in Entel as strategic [7]. Given that TI has invested at least over $600m in Entel, $170m seems low. Few possible explanations: (1) Entel was a rather sucky investment for TI; (2) Bolivian accusations are true and Entel has siphoned off profits thus recouping its investment (the "tax evasion" claim); or (3) TI's investments are not exactly what they seem (the "financial investments" claim.
Regarding the third point, something similar to what happened with the capitalized Bolivian flag carrier LAB (Lloyd Aero Boliviano) could have happened [2]. After the 50% stake in LAB was acquired by the Brazilian carrier VASP, LAB rented offices in Miami from VASP paying a total of $11.5m in rents over six years. Strangely enough LAB already had perfectly adequate offices in Miami. As a result significant percentage of VASP's total capitalization commitment of $47.5m was routed right back to where it came from.
As for the second point (tax evasion), it is also somewhat plausible. According to an anecdote related by Kohl & Farthing [2], Bolivian companies keep three sets of books (accounting). One set is accounts is kept for government inspections (taxes), another to show minority investors what supposedly is "really" happening at the company, and a third set that is kept internally to know what the true state of the company is. Naturally, the controlling investor(s) have privileged access to the accurate books.
Especially if the allegations of tax evasion and profit siphoning are true nationalization would make sense. However, strenghtening transparency and regularions could achieve (almost) the same thing, but without the imposition of a state owned behemoth on a sector that by all accounts benefits from competition.
References
- [1] "La recuperación de ENTEL no afectar los puestos de trabajo en esa empresa". Noticias de la presidencia de la república de Bolivia. La Paz. 3 de abril de 2007.
- [2] Kohl, Benjamin, and Linda Farthing. "Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal hegemony and popular resistance". London: Zed Books. 2006.
- [3] "Bolivia to Nationalize Top Phone Company". International Business Times. 2007-04-03.
- [4] "Bolivia to renationalise Entel". Telegeography. 2007-04-03.
- [5] Entel (company site)
- [6] Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones de Bolivia (the Bolivian telecommunications regulatory authority)
- [6] Entel. "Memorias" (2002-2005). See [5]. (annual reports of the company)
- [7] "Telecom >Italia talking informally with Bolivia over Entel stake". ABCmoney.co.uk. 2007-01-30.
Notes
- [Note 1] Supposedly low liquidity has also affected Entel's stock price. According to the most recent available yearly report (memoria 2005) for Entel [6: 2005], thirteen investors have 98.23% of Entel's shares. Euro Telecom International (ETI, a Telecom Italia subsidiary) has 50.00%, the two AFPs 23.73% each. Next ten biggest (reported) investors have 0.77% and the rest (unreported) 1.77%. Stakes of ETI and the AFPs appear to have remained mostly unaffected since capitalization. As such, the floating shares have come from the block originally allocated to employees.
Apple Bonjour, multicast DNS (MDNS) and BitTorrent
Amusing problems I've been having with my Internet service at home. I am subscribed with Welho, a local cable operator. Their Internet service is nothing special but having to wait over a month for DSL activation has always been two much for me. So when I returned from Damascus last year I decided to reinstate my service with Welho.
However, for the past couple of weeks performance has been terrible. A constant flow of over half a megabit per second has been coming in over the link. Some sniffing revealed that the traffic is multicast DNS, i.e. UDP traffic to port 5535 and multicast destination 224.0.0.251. Further debugging revealed that almost all of the traffic was DNS requests and responses for IN PTR _bittorrent_.tcp.local. Nice.
Apparently there are BitTorrent implementations that use multicasting and specifically the MDNS service to solicit tracker information. Despite quite a lot of googling I haven't found a specification for such a protovols nor details of which BitTorrent implementations use it.
Having found the source of the unwanted traffic I was still at a loss whether there was anything I could do to avoid it. I am not using BitTorrent (well, not at the moment, that is) so I wasn't exactly soliciting the traffic. Turns out that MDNS is what Apple's Bonjour (think iTunes sharing, for example) uses internally. Some experimenting revealed that whenever I switched on the WLAN on my Mac, an IGMP membership report was sent. In effect, the Mac announced that, yes, please, bring on all that MDNS traffic. Welho's network supports multicasting and I was also receiving an IGMP group membership query every two minutes. Disconnecting the Mac sniffing traffic with a Linux showed that after a few (unanswered) group membership queries the nexthop upstream router concluded membership as expired and the flood of BitTorrent MDNS ceased. Positively, roundtrip times to a host I was accessing over SSH dropped to under ten ms from an average of roughly 400 ms.
Finally, I decided to do away with Bonjour by disabling the mDNSResponder on my Mac. The launchctl command was helpful: "sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.mDNSResponder.plist". Now the IGMP queries go unanswered and no membership reports for MDNS are sent.
Moral of the story? Macs (or OSX) are nice and all, but too chatty for my tastes. With Linux I usually know what is going on, but the Mac just keeps talking behind your back (with the best of intentions to be sure, but still a bad idea). On the other hand, the BitTorrent over MDNS is clearly using a protocol for something it really wasn't intended to. And Welho doesn't escape blameless either. Bridging users to a /21 Ethernet segment allows MDNS to spread far too wide. The specification limits MDNS scope to link local, but it doesn't operate well in a /21 segment where the users are not on a LAN (as customarily understood).
Addendum: A note on a few interesting tools I used in debugging the problem. Debian package "mdns-scan" was interesting in scanning the /21 for services with MDNS. Running mdns-scan sends an "igmp v2 report" announcing membership in 224.0.0.251. Of course, the result was a flood of BitTorrent junk. Killing mdns-scan sends an appropriate "igmp leave" but it seems to take something like five minutes before the flood recedes. Another interesting Debian package: nemesis. With IGMP module of Nemesis it was easy to create IGMP report and leave messages from the command line. An IGMP report to announce membership and receive MDNS: "nemesis igmp -v -p 22 -i 224.0.0.251 -S 62.78.216.12 -D 224.0.0.251". A corresping IGMP leave is accomplished with: "nemesis igmp -v -p 23 -i 224.0.0.251 -S 62.78.216.12 -D 224.0.0.1". The -S switch specifies the source host address and should be modified.
Fri, 16 Feb 2007
Zambia, vultures and the need for a Drago Doctrine (version 2.0)
Was reading about the agreement between Lula and Evo on gas price increases, another $100m windfall for Bolivia, when I stumbled upon an interesting news item about Zambia, of all places. Apparently Zambia is in south central Africa, burdened with about $6bn of external debt, has GDP of roughly $10bn and imports and exports both howering at little under $2bn. Zambia's economy used to depend on copper exports and do rather okay by African standards. However, in late 1960s the copper industry was nationalized with unfortunate results. Come the 1970s and the oil shock hit and was then followed in mid-decade by a halving of copper prices on the world markets. By the 1980s, Zambia was neck deep in IMF debt. Decade on the copper industry was privatized again and reforms implemented in textbook Washington Consensus fashion. Not much good in that as opening of the economy decimated local industry. Recently, the copper industry has been showing some promise (with strong investment interests by the Chinese), but the HIPC initiative hasn't worked any wonders on the debt relief front.
Enough on the background. The news today was about some tractors that the Zambians bought from Romania in 1979. Not that they had the money, but kindly the Romanian government was keen on promoting its agricultural equipment industry and lent the Zambians what they needed. Presumably the tractors eventually arrived and were put to productive use. Fast forward twenty years. The Romanian government is still owed the debt by the Zambians. Nominally the debt is valued at around $30m, but the Romanians are taking a reasonable position and have all but agreed to settle the debt for $3m. Before the contract is signed an investment fund, Donegal International, registered in the British Virgin Islands, appears. Michael Sheehan, a US national and owner of Donegal contacts president Chiluba of Zambia and a donation to "Chiluba's favourite charity" is offered, a cool $2m. Suddenly, Zambia isn't interested in a deal with the Romanians anymore. Instead, the Romanians sell the debt to Donegal for $4m. At the time the Zambian government approves the move.
Fast forward again, this time to February 2007 and a court room in the UK. Donegal is demanding $55m from the Zambians. Apparently interest and "costs" have ballooned the debt somewhat. President Chiluba has been out of office since 2001 and the Zambians are no longer as pleased with their deal with Donegal. Despite protests from Gordon Brown and an assortment of debt relief activists, the judge is forced to approve of Donegal's case. Legality is on the vulture fund's side despite the gross immorality of the affair. As a result all of Zambia's assets in the UK are frozen; whether there are any, the reports don't tell. The case is still ongoing, but the speculation is that the judge would force Zambia to pay Donegal anywhere between $10m and $20m. Not nice, considering that the sum total of debt relief expected for Zambia this year is under $50m.
What I find interesting in the case is the clear abrogation of the Drago Doctrine. In 1902 the Europeans (Britain, Germany and Italy) were imposing a naval blockade on Venezuela and for good measure shelling the ports. The reason: Venezuela was hugely indebted and the Europeans were intent on collecting. Back in 1823, James Monroe, president of the US, had formulated what came to be called the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially the doctrine stated that the Latin American wars of independence had been concluded to the detriment of the Europeans and that the new order was irreversible, "America to the Americans" as it is succintly put. Building on the Monroe Doctrine, the Argentine foreign minister Luis María Drago in 1902 defined what has become to be known as the Drago Doctrine: "the public debt cannot bring about a military intervention or give merit to the material occupation of the soil of the American nations by a European power" (Drago's letter to the Argentine ambassador to the US, quoted in Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, p. 213).
Drago continued "in the first place the lender knows that he is entering into a contract with a sovereign entity, and it is an inherent qualification of all sovereignty that no proceedings for the execution of a judgement may be instituted or carried out against it, since this manner of collection will compromise its very existence and cause the independence and freedom of action of the respective government to disappear" (ibid., p. 214).
The crisis in Venezuela was eventually defused by US allusions to the Monroe Doctrine, and more concretely, by the proximity of the US Caribbean fleet. What precisely prompted the US to act was German imperial ambitios and intention to establish a permanent base on the Venezuelan coast. Having spared Venezuela of mafia-style debt collection by the Europeans, the US was quick to reconsider. Only two years later, in 1904, president Roosevelt announced the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. If debt default was a sovereign right, then what of the US investments in Latin America? Early on in the 20th century Britain was still the largest investor in Latin America, but by the Great Depression the US would have claimed its role as the foreign nation with most vested (financial) interest in the stability of its southern neighbours. "All nations are sovereign, but some are more sovereign than others," might be the succint version of Roosevelt's diluted Monroe Doctrine.
Having Zambia's assets frozen by a UK court on the behest of a private company, hmmh, doesn't that sound a bit contradictory if the Drago Doctrine and sovereignty in general are to hold? Neat that coercion can be achieved by switching a bit or two in some bank databases. No need for the fleet and all that shelling. Except, of course, that the UK is not the villain here, its doing its job in upholding the law though it mystifies me somewhat that case has even been accepted at a UK court. Presumably the tax haven where Donegal Investment is registered falls under British jurisdiction and perhaps the debt sale contract with the Romanians also applies under British law.
Common sense dictates that the bad guys here are Donegal, and perhaps the Zambian administration that approved the debt sale. Earlier the Zambians had offered Donegal $14m, but apparently that wasn't enough. Rather a pity that Zambia needs to go through the ordeal of an odious court case like this. Not easy to be a faithful debtor and maintain the good graces of the multilaterals. In the hopes of debt relief Zambia can't simply default and let Donegal feel the pain of a risk realized: that's what you get buying discount debt - it tends to be bad.
- News reports on the Zambia vs. Donegal Investments court case: BBC, Guardian Unlimited, TheLawyer.com.
- Drago and related doctrines (Wikipedia)
- Zambia's economy (surprisingly informative for a Wikipedia article, a lot more detailed than the corresponding article on Brazil that I looked earlier today)
- A report by the World Development Movement, Zambia: Condemned to debt (seems interesting, wish I had the time to really read it) (Update 13.3.2007: the report doesn't seem to be available at the same location and a quick search on the site didn't help.)
- (Update 13.3.2007: A post on the same issue by a pair of expats in Zambia.)
Kaksi vuotta Haririn salamurhasta
Kaksi vuotta sitten ystävänpäivänä olin saapunut ensimmäistä kertaa Damaskokseen pari päivää aiemmin. Kämppä oli vielä remontoitavana. Asuinpaikkani oli Carlton Hotel suunnilleen Mezzehin ja Kafar Sousehin välimaastossa. Hotellin ikkunasta näkyi iso armeijan kolossi. Otin siitä valokuvia havaitakseni päivällä isot "no photographs" -kyltit katutasossa. Ystävänpäivänä hotellin piha oli väärällään mersuja Libanonin kilvissä. Ensimmäinen kosketukseni Libanoniin. Huoneeni oli kuudennessa kerroksessa. Hotellin disko kerrosta ylempänä. Unta sain yöllä vasta kolmen jälkeen meiningin yläkerrassa hieman rauhoituttua. Libanonilaisnaisten korkokenkätanssi metelöi katon läpi huoneeseeni kerrassaan mahdottomasti.
En tuolloin tiennyt Libanonista kerrassaan mitään. Erityisen hyvin en voi väittää maata vieläkään ymmärtäväni, mutta ainakin tiedän riittävästi voidakseni olla vihainen seuratessani Libanonin säpälöitymistä. Rafik Harirista kuulin ensimmäistä kertaa vasta pommin jo räjähdettyä. Syyrialaisen asiakkaamme toimistolla pällisteltiin uutisia verkosta. En tuolloin tiennyt riittävästi edes syyrialaisista, että olisin voinut päätellä mitä mieltä paikalliset olivat tapahtuneesta. Kummallisen vaitonaisia olivat, muistan ihmetelleeni. Eipä kovin yllättävää näin myöhemmin tarkasteltuna.
Seuraavana päivänä lueskelin hallituksen englanninkielistä lehteä, Syrian Timesiä. Ei vaatinut kovin kummoista medialukutaitoa oppia lukemaan kyseistä propaganda-aviisia hieman epäuskoisesti virnistellen. Luonnollisesti SANA (Syrian Arab News Agency) osoitti syyttävän sormensa kohti Israelia. Selvähän se, on toki loogista, että näin mittavan operaation voi suorittaa vain valtiollinen toimija (tiedustelupalvelu) ja sehän on siis tietysti Mossad. Aina hämmästyttää kuinka suorastaan typeriltä dogmaattiset syyrialaislausunnot voivat kuullostaa. Varmasti Mossad olisi moisen iskun kyennyt suorittamaan, mutta miten Syyria saattoi antaa kyseisen kaltaisia lausuntoja, kun maan oma tiedustelupalvelu tunnetusti oli libanonilaiskätyriensä turvin suvereeni tiedusteluelin Libanonissa.
En voi väittää olevani kovin objektiivinen, toisaalta. Libanonista pidin välittömästi saapuessani sinne ensimmäistä kertaa pari viikkoa Haririn murhan jälkeen. En ole riittävän vanha, että olisin aktiivisesti seurannut tapahtumia Libanonin sisällissodan aikaan. Sodan jälkeiseltä ajalta mieleeni oli tarttunut vain sekalaisia havaintoja. Oikeastaan pidin maata kummallisena vakauden menettäneenä palestiinlaisterroristien temmellyskenttänä, josta ammuttiin raketteja Israeliin. En varmaan osannut tehdä kunnollista eroa palestiinalaisten ja Hizbollahin välille. Beirutista minulla oli kuva modernina ja vapaamielisenä kaupunkina, sellainen vauras ja raikas länsimaalaisuuden keidas arabimaailmassa.
Beirut täytti odotukseni. Suuntasin Hamraan, Hotel Mayflowerissa ja sen Duke of Wellington -baarissa voi istua ja siemailla libanonilaista Al-Mazaa -olutta (suosittelen, erityisesti kesäkuumalla Mayflowerin kattoterassilla nautittuna), en tiedä, ehkä siinä on sellaista kotoisuutta muuten vieraassa ympäristössä, joka on vastustamattoman kiehtovaa. En oikein osaa sitä selittää, ehkä siinä on hiven jotain kolonialistista. Hamra, Solidere, Rue Monot, Rauoche. Ei kovin representatiivinen kuva Beirutista, mutta se mitä olin hakemassa, vaihtelua Damaskokselle. Beirutissa oli illuusio vapaudesta. Damaskoksessa oli liiankin selvää, että sieltä se vapaus puuttui. Beirutissa sentään vapauden idea ainakin suunnilleen ymmärrettiin.
Maleksittuani illan Hamrassa, ihasteltuani Bliss Streetiä ja AUB:ta, kiertelin seuraavan päivän kaupungilla. Aikani etsiskeltyäni löysin marttyyrien aukiolle. Kiertelin seetrivallankumouksellisten telttaleirin pariin otteeseen. Paikalle majoittuneiden lisäksi ei väkeä vielä ollut kovin, mutta iltaa kohden aukio täyttyi. Kävin Haririn haudalla vielä silloin työnalla olleen, Haririn rahoittaman, moskeijan vieressä. Työmaa-aidat olivat täynnällään iskulauseita. Kolme keskeistä teemaa olivat: Syyria ulos (armeija, loppu miehitykselle), alas tiedusteluvalta (irti Syyrian tiedustelupalvelun ja näiden libanonilaiskätyreiden kahlitsevasta otteesta) ja totuus Haririn murhan toimeenpanijoista. Neljäntenä teemana telttakylän bannereissa ja plakaateissa perättiin libanonilaisten yhtenäisyyttä, pois uskonnollisten ryhmien vastakkainasettelu.
Varsin pinnallista tämä ryhmittymien välinen yhteiselo oli silloinkin. Istuskelin pitkään keskustelemasas erään teltan edustalla. Kertoivat olevansa druuseja. Eräs totesi: "Walid Jumblatt for president!" Muut toppuuttelivat (puolivakavissaan), hei, ei noin saa sanoa! Enpä oikein tiedä miten libanonin sektariaanisuutta voitaisiin purkaa. Edes seetrivallankumouksen "ytimessä" klaaniuskollisuus eli vahvasti. Kaksi vuotta myöhemmän hallituskriisin edellytykset olivat jo tuolloin selvästi esillä. Seetrivallankumous oli kuitenkin vahvasti keskiluokkainen, sunnien, kristittyjen ja druusien projekti. Shiiat olivat poissa ja osallistuivat vasta Hizbollahin masinoimiin vastamielenosoituksiin. Oli ehkä virhe sotkea sekä Syyria että Hizbollah samaan turvallisuusneuvoston päätöslauselmaan (1559). Vaikka ehkä on turha edes miettä, että Syyrian miehityksen purkaminen ja Hizbollahin aseistariisunta olisi voitu pitää erillään Yhdysvaltain ja Ranskan Libanonia tukevassa politiikassa. Silti se turhaan repi libanonilaista mielipidettä kahtaalle. Vastamielenosoituksillaan Hizbollah esitti tukensa Syyrialle, mutta samalla kamppaili omasta puolestaan päätöslauselmaa vastan.
Huolimatta eilisistä Bikfayan bussipommeista Haririn muistopäivä näyttää sujuneen rauhallisesti. Armeija on saanut pidettyä hallitusmieliset ja opposition irti toistensa kurkuista. Hyvä niin, mutta en oikeastaan edes uskonut kahden viikon takaisten mellakoiden toistuvan. Eilinen provokaatio epäonnistui. Se oli kerrassaan liian härski, aivan turhan yksioikoisesti hallitusmielisiä kristittyjä vastaan suunnattu. Se on uskomattoman surullista, että olisi Syyrian etujen mukaista provosoida koko Libanon kiehumaan yli. Onneksi provokaatio oli niin roistomaisen kovakourainen. Väitän sen lisänneen kaikkien osapuolten halua ystävänpäivän rauhanomaiseen läpivientiin. Jännitteet eivät ole mihinkään kadonneet, mutta olisi ollut kaikille aivan liian kriittistä antaa niiden purkautua tänään.
Niin se vain on - olen tainnut tulla itsekin dogmaattiseksi. En osaa nähdä muita tahoja Bikfayan pommien taustalla kuin Syyrian. Haririn tribunaali ei Syyrian näkökulmasta saa tapahtua. Syyrian tuomitseva ratkaisu tribunaalissa olisi Syyrian regiimille liian iso riski. Kansainvälinen yhteisö ei voisi olla asettamatta pakotteita. Syyria menettäisi sen tuen, joka sillä vielä arabimaiden yhteisössä on. Myös Iranin kärsivällisyys olisi koetuksella. Vahvasti ongelmainen Syyria olisi Iranille vain riippakivi. Hankala kevät on vielä edessä kaikille osapuolille. Hienoa, etteivät Ranska ja Yhdysvallat ole hylänneet Libanonia. Onneksi Yhdysvallat ei ole ollut valmis kompromissiin Syyrian kanssa Irakin rauhoittamiseksi. Siinä diilissä Libanon menisi uhrilampaana ja hyöty Irakin osalta olisi sekin kyseenalaista.
Fri, 02 Feb 2007Funny dream I had yesterday night. In the dream, I was at the Cable Factory, at our office. There were some other people as well. We were discussing the new rules issued by the building management. According to the rules it was not allowed anymore to have mattresses at office facilities. We understood that the rule was enacted to discourage people from sleeping at their offices, something that I imagine happens around here somewhat regularly here, what with all the artistic types. But in the dream our core concern was trying to classify the US Army issue field beds that we have. Would they be considered as mattresses or not?
Might as well have banned sleeping at offices. It closing on five in the morning at the moment and I am still here, at the office (wasn't here yesterday though when I had the dream). With ramen noodles and yerba mate. Its snowing, but sparsely. Quite pretty actually. Surprisingly light out there, sort of yellowish fog. Listening to Songs: Ohia's "The Magnolia Electric Co". Very peaceful. A bit cold here but it always is during the night.
It's been already three weeks since we returned from Lebanon. Should take some time next weekend and sort through the pictures. And write a travel diary of sorts. It was a good trip. We got out in good time before the general strike and the clashes that followed. But time to sleep.
Thu, 19 Oct 2006
Surfing for swell forecasts (at 5,99 €/MB)
Duh, yeah, surfing is expensive, but I thought it mostly had to do with the transportation (300 km of driving one way between Helsinki and Pori) and with the time invested (lost productivity). Earlier today Sonera was king enough drop me an sms and inform that my next mobile phone bill would be in the order of 180 euros. Like, I mean, wtf?
Apparently I am being charged for - well - surfing. The past week I'd done two trips to Pori and having stayed in Raisio I'd been forced to bear with the wonders of the mobile Internet for my swell forecasts. Setting up the network connection via Bluetooth between my Powerbook and Nokia had been relatively painless. I was a bit mystified though that things just worked. I didn't recall ever ordering any GPRS package with my subscription. But no matter, it worked and since none of my mobile-IRC addicted friends had complained of excessive costs, I was more or less satisfied.
As it turns out, my subscription has had a basic data service by default. Fine except that traffic is charged at a completely ridiculous 5,99 euros per MB. Having surfed for swell forecasts (and some IRC, a bit of news.bbc.co.uk) for some 25 MB, the data transfer bill stands at 150,18 euros.
Sucks, but oh well, doesn't really compare with the first bill from Sonera after a couple of weeks in Damascus. At well over a thousand euros that's a clear record. That was covered by the company, but swell forecast surfing, that's on me.
P.S. No, I am not writing this over GPRS, but rather at the city library of Raisio where they have excellent WLAN, at no cost.
Mon, 14 Aug 2006So we now have a UN security council resolution, 1701. And an agreed upon time for the ceasefire to come into effect in roughly four hours (on Monday at 0500 UTC). Heavy fighting in the south through Sunday, Israelis bombing southern Beirut and over two hundred and fifty Katyushas in the Isreali north. Lebanese cabinet agrees to 1701 on Saturday, but fails to even have a scheduled meeting the next day to start discussions on the actual (and crucial) implementation details. Nasrallah has also voiced his and Hezbollah's commitment to abide by 1701 except of course that as long as the IDF is present in Lebanon that abidance is effectively null and void.
I don't know. Maybe there would be room for cautious optimism, but still: the truce is very fragile indeed and clashes between HA and IDF seem inevitable. It all depends on Hezbollah. Isreal went to war with a stated objective of Hezbollah's annihilation. Hezbollah is still there, keeping up the barrage of rockets on Sunday as usual. Israelis have advanced up to the Litani river, but certainly haven't secured the territory. Militarily HA has won and IDF lost.
Politically it is still unclear. Maybe Olmert can salvage something out of the disaster, like, why was it all worth it. Lebanon is still hostage to Hezbollah. Why would they give up such a position? Shebaa is a sham, convienient excuse to keep up the "resistance" credentials. Shebaa is only resistance to disarm, resistance to compromise, resistance to participate in a pluralistic democracy, resistance to be truly Lebanese. By virtue of its ability to execute on its own foreign policy Hezbollah has unique control over Lebanese domestic politics. Being "truly Lebanese" Hezbollah would not resist being stripped of such control.
Funny the way Hezbollah is seen as an Iranian/Syrian proxy or champions of Arabism/Islamism. As if Hezbollah is by default part of a bigger game. Certainly it is, but such thinking also merges Lebanon into wider conflicts. Lebanon has suffered enough for being a proxy in regional struggles and has sacrificed enough in championing causes of pan-whatever.
I wrote about it before, but I say it again. Hezbollah must disarm, but Lebanese domestic politics must be reformed. Current model of confessional democracy doesn't work for Hezbollah. Demographic realities must be adhered to and in return Hezbollah must become a true party in the liberal democratic sense. What we'll have then is a real test of the democratic peace theory. Israel is a democratic state. With a democratic, authoritative Lebanese state as a counterpart, could they make the theory work and maintain peace?
Mon, 31 Jul 2006
Hezbollah courageous? I don't think so.
We had an interview of the author Emily Nasrallah in the local daily, Helsingin Sanomat. I've been carrying around a collection of her short stories for a week or so, but haven't actually managed beyond the introduction. What amazed me in the interview was what she said about Hezbollah.
"War always creates more problems than it solves. Nevertheless on can't but admire the courage and will power of the Hezbollah fighters. They risen to oppose Israel, the strongest military might in the region, in a manner that no Arab country has been bold enough to do. It is astonishing even if one doesn't support Hezbollah itself."
Some semi-serious comparisons have been made between Nasrallah (Hassan) and Che Guevara. What Nasrallah (Emily) says reminds me of my own stance towards Che. I've never endorsed Che's politics, I've always considered his methods reprehensible, but I've always admired his attitude. Che believed and was consistent in acting on his beliefs.
With Hezbollah I can't accept the politics or the methods, nor admire the attitude. First, the premises of Hezbollah as the "resistence" are void. Shebaa is simply not worth it; prisoners would be freed if Hezbollah disarmed; and being dogmatically anti-Israeli is utterly out of touch of any realpolitik.
Second, the methods? Saturating civilian targets with Katyushas, very civilized indeed. As a friend pointed out, the asymmetric ratio of civilian deaths between Lebanon and Israel is not due to lack of malicious intent on the part of Hezbollah. The Israelis simply have better weapons, but both sides are causing unacceptable death and terror among the civilian population.
Third, would I admire the courage of Hezbollah fighters? It takes some gall to take on Israel, but the purity of Hezbollah's motives is absolutely open to question. And what courage is there in sacrificing Lebanon for politics that don't make sense and are not backed by a shared agreement covering the whole polity. Subjecting Lebanon to destruction for parochial interests is at best cowardly.
Granted, much of the criticism could be levied on Che as well. So maybe it is just that Che with his beret and scragly beard cuts a more dashing figure than Nasrallah in his robes and groomed beard.
Sun, 30 Jul 2006
Israel halts air strikes, what about the Katyushas?
According to Reuters Israel has acquiesced to a two day cessation of air strikes. Depressing that it was necessary to have a tragedy in Qana once again. But had this worst hit of the war happened elsewhere it wouldn't have carried to same strong symbolic meaning and perhaps not forced the Israelis to compromise.
However, forty eight hours is a very short period of time indeed. The security council will undoubtedly convene and must hammer together a convincing resolution. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, resolution 1559 will be reiterated. Hezbollah must disarm, Lebanese army to be deployed in the south and a "robust" international force organized to assist the army. A prisoner exchange should also happen. The Israelis will not accept anything less.
I am not feeling very optimistic. Isreal wanted to have ten to fourteen days to "finish the operation". What would that have entailed? More bombardment of the south. More civilian casualties as there is no easy way out of the villages in the south. Before the announcement of a halt in air strikes Israel had warned the residents of two villages in the south of imminent strikes. In a show of astonishing arrogance the Isrealis had been demanding the UN evacuate the residents of the villages before sunset. Considering the lack of care the IDF showed towards the UN last Tuesday in Khiam, it is no wonder that Annan promptly retorted with a "no way".
No aerial bombardment, but what will the IDF do then? Certainly they will not stand idle while Hezbollah continues with rockets. More rockets were launched today at Israel than on any day before. Extending ground operations within Lebanon seems out of the question for the IDF. After several bloody days of combat around Bint Jbeil resulted in a failure of the IDF to secure the city and in a retreat on Saturday, it doesn't seem likely they would take on Hezbollah at close quarters. Seeing that the internal debate within Israel has been growing critical of the abilities of the IDF to achieve destruction of Hezbollah (at least with current tactics), it is conceivable that Israel would give diplomacy a chance.
Again, I am not optimistic. Hezbollah's capabilities have probably not been significantly impaired and thus they have little incentive to stop rocketing south of the border. Unless the diplomatic efforts achieve a breakthrough and an agreement with Hezbollah by Wednesday, the IDF will commence with increased vigor and bomb southern Lebanon to cincers. Nothing much else they can do.
Everything now depends on Hezbollah. What was Hezbollah expecting on the 12th of July when they launched their crossborder assault? A simple prisoner exchange to bolster their standing as champions of pan-Arabism and as the arch enemy of Isreal; after all, can't let Hamas and Khaled Meshaal steal the show. If Hezbollah was not counting on an all out war with the IDF, they might be ready to cease hostilities. What would be needed then would be a reshaping of internal Lebanese politics.
Hezbollah as a political party is less significant than Hezbollah as a guerrilla force executing its own foreign policy at the expense of the Lebanese state. By engaging in violent geopolitics Hezbollah can force its hand in Lebanese politics and effectively holds a veto. Hezbollah upends the doctrine of war as an extension of politics. With its wargames it plays the worn out "undermine the state in order to bolster your sectarian interests" routine. Since the cedar revolution and ousting of the Syrians, it is Hezbollah that has refused the return to a pre-1976 pluralism, fragile though that might have always been.
I can't see Hezbollah disarming except if it can be reborn as a bona fide political party sans militia, but with significantly increased political influence. An overdue deconfessionalisation of the Lebanese electoral system would achieve this. On the short term sectarian interests of the Shiite would gain. Longer term one might hope for a truly deconfessionalized system where parties are formed around issues and ideologies that cut through sectarian boundaries. Nasrallah has claimed that it is not the aim of Hezbollah to mold Lebanon into an Iranian style Hezbollahstan. Maybe Hezbollah could indeed function as a constructive actor in a liberal democratic system. If not, then it doesn't seem possible for Mount Lebanon and Hezbollahstan to coexist within one sovereign state.
Thu, 27 Jul 2006
A first-third-life crisis? No way, skateboarding rules!
I think midlife crisis is outdated. If one is to live, say, ninety years, what's so special in being in your forties or fifties? Would seem that a partitioning life into three thirty year segments would be more appropriate. First thirty you learn, next thirty you apply and do your contribution to society, last thirty you relax; I mean, the mid-thirty were tough enough so you've got the right to chill out a bit before the end.
So I've been thirty for close to half a year already. Have I hit the crisis yet, have I readjusted, have I started to take things seriously, have begun to contribute? Not really. Instead I've regressed. In a desperate attempt to shake off some fifteen of the accumulated thirty I've taken to skateboarding with some gusto.
Sometime circa mid-nineties I saw an ad in Wired. A fellow was bombing down a hill with a Sector 9 longboard. Not that I'd ever seen a longboard before, but I wanted one. Sure I'd had a skateboard back in the eighties. Still, at the advanced age of twenty-three I felt too embarrassed to be buying a skateboard. At the surf/skate shop in Santa Cruz, California I lied to be purchasing the board for one of my brothers. When I picked up the board later (after my first ever session of surfing, yeah, I had try all these things Californian) the people at the shop reminded me not to try it out, it was for my brother, after all. Trying to cover my bluff I retorted lamely, oh no, I wouldn't dare, I can wipe out on snow or water, but asphalt is not for me.
Being on my eighth season with longboards I've mostly used them for downhill and as an alternative mode of transport: almost as fast as a bicycle and you can grab the board and hitch a ride with public transport no problem.
Last week though I passed by a small, wide and, crucially, empty vertical ramp. Next morning, Friday, on my way to the office I went to try it out. Feeling seriously goofy I tried the simplest thing possible: pumping for speed. Surprisingly, it worked and I was able to ride up and down the curving sides of the ramp. Amazing how heavy it can be on your feet. After an hour or so I had to call it a day as my legs turned to spaghetti didn't seem to support me anymore in an accident free zone.
Had to purchase new wheels and bearings that day. On my way from the ramp to the office the bearings in one wheel had got stuck. I rode in anyway, but shouldn't have. Visiting a skate shop to buy new bearings I found out that the wheel with faulty bearings had actually melted. Never seen that happen before. Sad. Those where the wheels I'd bought from the shop in Santa Cruz and they were still my favourite set.
Last Monday brought in new advances in my newly found passion for skating the ramp. I managed to make clean turns (one-eighty degrees) both back and front side. As well I could connect those turns and keep up momentum in the ramp. Three sessions in total that day, two at Lauttasaari and one in Leppävaara. I like the ramp in Lauttasaari a lot better, being rather wide I don't need to fear dropping of the sides.
Late afternoon now. What've I done today? Slept late, gone skating. Bad for work. Met a fellow from the longboard crowd at the ramp. He had a rather interesting shortboard, a bit longer and wider than the norm. More manouverable than my longboard, yet still with quit a bit more stability than regular shortboards, those I can't handle at all. Too bad you can get those only direct from the vendor, Conspiracy Skateboards. They're in Denver, Colorado of all places. With $75 for board and overseas shipment it's not too bad though.
Sorry for such a stoked tirade, but I had to. ;-)
Wed, 26 Jul 2006
Seeing Beirut, thinking Quneitra
When my brother visited me in Damascus last fall we day tripped to the village of Quneitra. Beyond the modern village lies a strip of UN controlled land accessible from Syria, beyond that the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. A permit (easily obtained in Damascus) is required to enter old Quneitra. Also, a representative of the Syrian security services will accompany all visitors and show around the "sights".
My feelings towards the visit are mixed. What the Syrians want visitors to see is a testament to the evils of the Israelis. When the Israelis retreated after the 1967 war they purposefully ruined most of the village. The Syrians have left things as is except (naturally) adding signs such as "Quneitra hospital: turned by the Zionists in to a firing target and destroyed".
After the visit I was feeling rather disgusted. No denying that the Isrealis had reduced buildings to rubble, but first and foremost I was feeling the usual nausea of an onslaught of Syrian propaganda. Having been in Syria for months and months I had little patience for the dogmatic anti-Israeli drivel propagated by the regime and sadly accepted by the population at large. Why support a war memorial when it serves a repressive regime that requires an external enemy as an important source of domestic support?
Some five months after the visit I was in Damascus again and staying in the al-Rabie hotel (highly recommended), a backpacker haunt. There I met a Japanese-Korean fellow. He'd visited Quneitra earlier that day and was highly impressed. For him the site had meaning as a way to grasp what war is truly about. A valid viewpoint, I agreed, but still it was hard for me to see the village as anything but a propaganda exhibit.
The reason why I am writing about this are the pictures coming from south Beirut and the border. First few days of the war I didn't seem to quite grasp the situation. The south was inaccessible and Hezbollah had cordoned off south Beirut. Walking around in Beirut I've seen enough reminders of the previous wars - buildings left standing as skeletons only and the ubiquitous pockmarks of machine gun fire - to have thought I knew the look of destruction. Not so, not at all. I've seen a living Beirut, not Beirut being destroyed, reduced to non-existence.
Please, IDF, don't destroy Lebanon. Hezbollah asked for war, I don't really care about them, but Lebanon has been scarred enough.
Wed, 19 Jul 2006On Monday I went with a friend to a demonstration in the center of Helsinki organized by an "anti-war network" (pictures). What I wanted to do was show my support for Lebanon, but I should have known: instead of acknowledging the complexity of the situation in Lebanon the demonstration was an uncritical display of anti-Israeli fervor.
Please, Lebanon is not Palestine. Despite the many similarities between the ongoing crises in Gaza and Lebanon, serious confusion results whenever they are lumped together in a mess of anti-Isreali sentiment. Marching with indignation to the Isreali embassy in Helsinki the demonstration seemingly managed to absolve Hezbollah of any responsibility. Instead we were treated to a speech by a representative of the Palestinian authorities treating us to claims such as Israel being the sole remaining occupying power in the world and the legitimacy of "resistance" against Israel.
Admitted there was one small banner stating the obvious "Hezbollah != Lebanon". Whenever the marching crowd was chanting "Olmert is a killer, Bush is a killer" my friend and I tried timidly to follow with "Nasrallah is a killer". Ditto with "Hezbollah is terrorist" to "Israel is terrorist, America is terrorist". We managed to draw glances from several of our fellow marchers, but whether they approved or not, I don't know.
If only Hezbollah would have an embassy, I'd be there demonstrating daily. But that's wishful thinking; Hezbollah simply executes their own foreign policy on the expense of Lebanon as a whole. Simply the worst piece of utter bs during this campaign has been the Hezbollah appeal for Lebanese patriotism, the claim to be working in the interests of the Lebanese people.
After the demonstration we headed out to support Lebanon by buying four bottles of 2003 Chateau Ksara. Earlier that day my mother had raided the local store and emptied the shelves of Ksara with a purchase of nine bottles. As of today, they still hadn't restocked.
Everybody in the Alko service area (i.e. Finland), do something little and buy a bottle or two of Ksara or Musar. We need to empty the central storage facilities of Alko of all Lebanese wines. Once the Isreali blockade clears we want Alko to have new order out. Also, let me know if there are other Lebanese products available here.
Addendum: Last week Umayya Abu-Hanna and small group of people organized a rather more subdued, but in my opinion more appropriate demonstration. White flowers were laid in front of the Israeli embassy.
Update: Over at The Lebanese Bloggers a similar experience at a rally is described: if one condemns Hezbollah, people seem to assume that as an implicit an approval of Israeli actions.
Update, 2006-07-26: Another rally was held in Helsinki last Monday (pictures). I didn't attend, but according to reports in local media the crowd marched to the embassy again and burned a homemade Israeli flag. I don't really approve. Wholehearted demonization of Isreal and mixing up the Lebanese and Palestinian issues is not productive and most of all absolves Hezbollah.
Mon, 27 Mar 2006Säädinpä hieman Blosxomia eli käyttämääni blogimoottoria. Kauniilta ei ei edelleenkään näytä. Olkoot. Blogit ovat muutoinkin turhan kronologisia. Toivoisin enemmän wikimäisyyttä, mutta sellainen virittely jäänee tuonnemmaksi.
Myöhään taas istuskelen toimistolla. Vuorokausi vaihtuu kohta. Lopetin työt tunti sitten oltuani täällä puolen vuorokautta. Olisi aika lähteä tallustamaan kotiin. Se on sitten tunnin kävely, mutta ei uni muuten tule. Ei voi ottaa suoraan taksia kotiin. Ehkä kotona voisi suihkussakin käydä. Kummallisesti kämppä tarjoilee lämmintä vettä vain aamuyöllä eikä aina silloinkaan. Kylmä vesi vuorilta heti aamutuimaan ei kovin innosta.
Onko tänään jo maanantai? Kolme työpäivää mennyt kuin huomaamatta. Enää toiset kolme ja sitten perjantaina vapaa. Vähän kehnolla mielellä tein tämän pitkän päivän. Kurja pää, ihan rikki. Eilen oli parempi ja tuotteliaampaa. Ehkä projekti vielä saadaan kunnialla kasaan vaikka onhan tässä selkeät riskinsä.
Kämpille.
Sat, 25 Mar 2006Kolmekymmentä vuotta ja yksi kuukausi. Olen ehtinyt aikani vaeltaa. Lienenkö mitään oppinut? Marisin illalla irkkiin pitäessäni töistä taukoa. Kirosin työtäni ja sen implikaatioita. Kevensin sydäntäni. Mahtavat #kasvualla piakkoin taas kyllästyä. Syyriassa taas. Saadaan kuulla toistuvia angstisia vuodatuksia kanavalla, sitten se taas menee, tekee työtä pari tuntia ja eiköhän vaan ole kohta taas takaisin ja sama virsi.
Se on vähemmän hauskaa huomata miten helposti vanhoihin rutiineihin on pudota. Syksyllä oli täällä töitä mahdottomasti. Yritettiin saada projekti kasaan, ei saatu, tietenkään - siksi olen takaisin. Vietin öitä toimistolla, talsin aamurukousten aikaan himaan, nukahdin aamupäiväksi ja olin iltapäivän aluksi takaisin töissä. Syyrialaiset pitivät minua täysin tärähtäneenä. Hyvästä syystä.
Eilen perjantaina kävin vuorilla juoksemassa. Vähäisen unen ja ylenmääräisen Kefrayan voimalla, mutta silti. Olin kotona illalla. Yritin lukea, mutta väsy tuli. Simahdin sohvalle heräten siitä tänään aamulla, myöhässä.
Herään sohvalta, Morcheeba: Wonders Never Cease, pidin kovasti tästä kappaleesta kesällä, masennuttaa, hiukset ovat oluessa (olen käynyt Hashilla ja pitkästä aikaa, sitä se teettää, klubiin palaavia rangaistaan), masennuttaa, olen lähdössä liian myöhään liikkeelle, suihku ei taaskaan toimi, vain haaleaa vetta, miten pirussa ihmisen pitäisi hässikaljaiset hiukset kylmällä vedellä pestä, hä?
Katson surffifilmiä läppäriltä, takut pois hiuksista, vaatteet ovat ryppyiset, kaksi silitysrautaa olen ostanut, molemmat antanut pois, en ole uskonut takaisin tulevani, katselen keittiön ikkunasta moskeijaa auringossa, kaupungin yllä on tummat pilvet ja smogiharso, tuolilta kuivumasta tummunut t-paita, näyttää olevan yksi niistä, jotka ostin lentoyhtiön lähettäessä tavarani ensin epähuomiossa Pariisiin ja sieltä viiveellä Beirutin kautta tänne.
Irkissä väitettiin tänään, että olen kenties Syyriassa saanut arvokkaan opetuksen. Oppinut ymmärtämään itseäni ja ehkä myös ympäröivää maailmaa. Ehkä näin on. Pureksimista tämä vähän yli vuoden aika vaatii. On opittava tarkemmin harkitsemaan mihin sitoutuu. Ei ole ollut helppo komennus. Vaan ei voi mitään. Olisin voinut projektista sanoutua irti, mutta en sitä tehnyt. On homma hoidettava eikä se sinällään hankalaa olekaan. Kolmisen viikkoa enää. Enemmän varmaan katuisin ellen töitäni loppuun hoitaisi.
Perhanan syyrialainen valtiokoneisto. Yksi kleptokraatinen mafia koko arabisosialistisen pyramidin korkein kerros. Se on uskomatonta kuinka paljon täällä voidaan käyttää energiaa vaikka Israelin vihaamiseen. Onhan sille syynsä, mutta Syyriassa patrioottisen mouhotuksen taustalla on vain diktatuurin ylläpito. Ulkopoliittisen tilanteen varjolla oikeutetaan sisäpoliittinen kuri ja järjestys.
Olen keventänyt sydäntäni.
(Aivan liina myöhään olen valveilla, mutta pelästyin menettäneeni arvokkaan unitunnin. En sentään. Se olikin vain kesäaikaan siirtyminen Suomessa. Syyriassa olemme vielä talvessa.)
Fri, 24 Mar 2006(Aamuyöllä perjantaina 24.3.2006.)
Kämpän vieressä, ostarilla olevan kahvilan seinään on ilmestynyt: FREE INTERNET WIRELESS - sellaisin järkälemäisin kirjaimin, joiden tuottamiseksi lienee uhratun useampia Damaskoksen pörröisistä kulkukissoista. Olin mojunut toimistolla turhan myöhään ja rauhoittavaksi iltakävelyksi tallustelin Muhagrinista alas Umaijadi-aukiolle, otin taksin al-Akramin moskeijalle ja kävelin siitä ostarin ohi kohti kotia.
En voinut vastustaa kiusausta. Kaivoin läppärin esille ja kävin istuskelemaan kahvilan viereen. Itse kahvila oli jo sulki, mutta sisältä kuului hiljaista musiikkia ja siivouksen ääniä. Odottelin koska minut tullaan ajamaan pois. Siinä on omanlaistansa tunnelmaa istua läppäri sylissä etelän lämpimässä yössä.
Avoin verkko löytyi, "wlan-ap". Sain osoitteen, "192.168.1.254". Yritin ottaa ssh-yhteyden kotiin ja morjenstaa porukoita irkissä, ei onnistunut. Eikä onnistunut selailukaan. "netstat -rn" ja tukiaseman osoite selville. "nmap" ja avoimena löytyi 23/tcp (telnet), 53/tcp (domain) ja 80/tcp (http). Selaimella kiinni tukiasemaan, salasanaa kysytään. Ok, leikitään mukana, annetaan "admin" ja "admin". Kappas vain ja säkiti säk.
Vänkää, hurjaa haxorointia, mutta siihen se jäi. Otti akku ja loppui. Kävelin kotiin. Kahvilan "ADSL Firewall Router" oli merkkiä "Billion" ja sehän on tietysti "Powering communications with Security". Hyvä niin, mutta tyhmiltä käyttäjiltä ei pelasta biljoona ja risat turvaominaisuutta.
Kuuntelen irkkumusaa, Planxty. Oli taas hauskat speksaukset #kasvualla. Melkein vakavissaan oltiin vuokraamassa kämppää kesälle kuukaudeksi Irlannista ison veden rannalta. Idea siis olisi tietysti tehdä kuukausi ankaraa koodausta fisuksen tuotekehitysprojektien eteen. Aavistuksen verran toteuttamiskelvoton idea, mutta sen verta sekopäinen, että en yllättyisi vaikka se peräti ottaisi ja toteutuisi.
(Äh äh. Kylpyammeessa on selälleen kellahtunut kuolleeksi mennyt torakka. Ärsyttää. Mielentilani ei ole kovin torakkamyönteinen. Eilen tulin kotiin. Avasin vessan oven ja putosi torakka niskaan. Se kipitti makuuhuoneeseen ja varmaan muutti asumaan sänkyni alle.)
Tue, 21 Mar 2006tiistaina 21.3.2006
Viime vuonna samaan aikaan vanhemmat olivat käymässä Damaskoksessa. Vietettiin levantilaista äitienpäivää. Töissä tänään vain valtion porukat. Varsinaisen asiakkaamme - yksityinen yhtiö - henkilöstöllä on ensimmäistä kertaa äitienpäivä lomaa. Kertoivat siitä sunnuntaina innolla. Äitienpäivän tosin huomasin jo Beirutissa, kadunvarret täynnällään isoja mainostauluja: äitienpäivä tulee, osta äidille jotain kivaa.
(tiistaina 21.3.2006)
Chateau Kefraya 2004, Vallée de la Békaa, Liban. Jos olisin viiniasiantuntija, osaisin kuvailla kokemani makuelämyksen. Koska en kuitenkaan ole edes libanonilaisten viinien asiantuntija, voin vain todeta maun olevan varsin voimakkaan happaman kirpeä ja sanoisinko ontohko. Sopivasti ennakoiden olisin älynnyt pysähtyä Beirutissa ostamassa opuksen maan viineistä. Eihän tässä oikeastaan muuta tekemistä olekaan kuin puolet vuorokaudesta viettää toimistolla, kolmannes unessa ja vapaa-ajan kuudenneksen voi maleksua kirjoitellen vaikkapa näin Kefrayan äärellä.
Tylsistytti lähtiessäni iltasella toimistolta. En kerrassaan viitsinyt jäädä kadunvarteen metsästämään vapaata taksia. Lähdin suosiolla talsimaan ylhäältä vuorelta alas Umaijadi-aukiolle ja sieltä Mezzeh autostradan vartta kotiin. Vuorelta öisen pimeä Damaskos on aina vaikuttava. Matkalla aukiolle ohitin Suomen suurlähetystön, joka Tanskan ja Ruotsin lähetystöistä poiketen oli säästynyt hallituksen masinoimalta pyromaaniselta kansankiihkolta.
Islamilainen perimätieto kertoo profeetta Muhammadin olleen kauppamatkalla Bilad as-Shaamissa, pohjoisen mailla. Muhammad katseli kaupunkia vuorelta ja totesi: minä astun paratiisiin vain kerran. Näin Muhammadilta jäi Damaskos käymättä. Se Damaskos, jossa Barada tarkoitti karmaisevuudellaan viha-rakkaussuhdetta elättävän oluen sijasta kaupungin läpi virtaavaa vuolasta jokea. Se Damaskos, joka oli tunnettu vehreydestään.
Aiemmin pidin kaupunkia rähjäisyydessään omalla tavallaan romanttisena. En enää, masentavaa kurjuutta vain eikä se vallitsevan sosialistisen kleptokratian alaisuudessa mihinkään kehity. Mitä ihmettä ranskalaisnuoret mesoavat taas barrikadeilla? Kävisivät Syyriassa katsomassa mihin päädytään, kun työsuojelussa mennään siihen, että valtaosa väestöstä työskentelee valtiolle ja potkut ovat aina ministeritason päätös. Markkinamekanismin luovan tuhon ylenmääräisen kahlitsemisen seurauksena on statismia, jossa ensin ihminen ei voi tehdä mitään ja siihen totuttuaan ei uskalla mitään.
Huolestuttavaa. Voisin vallitsevassa mielentilassani lukea vaikkapa Ayn Randia.
Se on kummallista kuinka nopeasti sitä omaksuu vanhat toimintavat ja habituksen. Olen ollut täällä vasta muutaman päivän, mutta olen tehokkaasti putoamassa siihen samaan rutiiniin, josta kolme kuukautta sitten lähdin. Samat työt, sama kämppä. Sama kaoottinen kaupunki, samat tuoksut ja hajut. Havahduin auringon laskiessa ensimmäistä kertaa huomioimaan rukouskutsun. Vuosi sitten aloittaessani täällä saatoin herätä aikaisin aamulla kämpän lähellä olevien moskeijoiden kutsuun. Olin kai niin tottunut rukouskutsuihin, että pari päivää kesti ennen kuin edes kunnolla havaitsin ne.
Matkalla vuorelta kävelin puiston halki. Nokkaan luikerteli tuttu tuoksu. Katsahdin ja pariskunta oli leppoisasti polttelemassa vesipiippua. Autostradan varrella sisäpihan portin alta maleksia vastaan pörröinen kulkukissa. Risteyksessä tien reunassa istui mies pyörätuolissa. Varmaan oli kerjuulla. En antanut rahaa. Ehkä olisi pitänyt, mutta kovetin sydämeni. Jos yhdelle lantin lahjoittaa, pitää sitten kaikille eikä siitä tule loppua. Tuntuu vaikeammalta kuin viimeksi olla etuoikeutettu länsimaalainen. Katselin kateellisena tien varteen parkkeerattuja uusia bemareita, mersuja ja kaupunkimaastureita. Varallisuuden sijasta etuoikeutetun asemani perusta on kuitenkin taustani suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa. Se on kuin trampoliini. Silti on aika helppo ponnistaa vaikka kuinka korkealle.
Sen kunniaksi kaadan toisen lasillisen Kefrayaa ja menen tyhjentämään pesukoneen.
Sun, 19 Mar 2006sunnuntaina 19.3.2006
Saavuin juuri kämpille ja perin kummallista - niin kummallista, että on heti kirjoitettava. Mikään ei ole muuttunut. Olen ollut kolme kuukautta Suomessa ja on kuin palaisin viettämästä viikonloppua Beirutissa. Jääkaapissa on edelleen vanhat vesipullot, erityisen viileinä, syyrialaiset tiivistemehut, joista saa vain tahmeaa mönjää vesilasillisen pohjalle, tyhjät pullot keittiön pöydällä ja kaksi libanonilaista viinipulloa Choutturamasta - se kauppakahvila, jossa likimain aina taksit pysähtyvät lähellä rajaa - molemmat täysiä, ei Ksaraa, mutta yksi Chateau Kefraya ja toinen Nakad, molemmat Bekaan laaksosta, sekä tietysti puolikas pullo jordanilaista Bavrok vodkaa, josta appelsiinitiivistemehulla saa mitä karmaisevimpia ruuvimeisseleitä.
Makuuhuoneen prinsessapedissä on puhtaat lakanat ja ihana paksu täkki Mezzeh autostradan Rankoussista, eipä ole tainnut karhut nukkua prinsessan ollessa poissa vai miten päin se menee. Olohuoneen tuolilta löytyy nivaska hihattomia t-paitoja, en viitsinyt raahata niitä Suomeen sekä puolen tusinaa käyttämättömiä, Nikea kloonaavia ja aivan liian pieniä sukkia, jotka minulle onnistuttiin myymään kerran Baramkessa odottaessani taksia täyttyväksi kohti Beirutia. Suurlähetystön Suomi-esitteet ja joulukuuta osoittava Suomi 2005 -kalenteri ovat tietysti paikallaan.
Uskaltauduin vessaan. Taskulamppu on sekin tallella, mutta tällä kertaa kämpässä onneksi on sähköt. No, olipa siivo. Minunkin epäkelpo nenäni haistaa kämpässä oudon ödöörin, johon lienin aiemmin tottunut. Ei torakoita, elävinä tai kuolleina, mutta kasoittain hiekanjyväsiä, joita muurahaiset termiitteinä möyhivät talon rakenteista. En kyllä myönnä jättäneeni vessaa moiseen siivoon, en varmasti. Kämpän lattia on muutenkin aika inha, ei houkuttele tallustelemaan pehmein villasukin, sain ne joululahjaksi. Kolmessa kuukaudessa kuontaloni sulkasato on ehtinyt kerääntyä palleroiksi lattialle ja kasoiksi nurkkiin.
Lienee aika suunnata kioskikaupalle. Aamiasta tarvitsisin ja ehkä löytyisi korkkiruuvi maistaakseni lasillisen Kefrayaa.
Eipä löytynyt tuosta paremmasta (siis isommasta ja markettimaisemmasta eli tyhmälle länsimaalaiselle helpommasta ja kontaktia välttelevämmästä) kaupasta korkkiruuvia (miksi löytyisi, kun olutkin on non-alcoholic; kioskien alkoholiton siideri on tosin hyvää) eikä myöskään arabirieskaa, joka tappiona on merkittävämpi. Mahtaisinko vaivautua köpöttelemään Iranin ja Kanadan suurlähetystöjen tienoille Family Mart -kauppaan, sieltä varmasti saisin korkkiruuvin ja muutakin hyödyllistä. Pizzan saisi siitä vierestä myös. Ottaisi mukaan Jemenin matkakirjan ja lueskelisi hetken. Vähän on väsy, mutta ei kuitenkaan uni tule, sellainen levoton olo uusvanhaan ympäristöön saavuttaessa.
Niin, Pampan appelsiini-porkkanaa onneksi löytyi, se on kerrassaan mainiota mehua, mutta kierrättämättömät lasipullot ovat aivan katastrofi. Katsos, äidin ja isän vuosi sitten tuomia pääsiäisserviettejä on vielä muutama keittiössä.
En vaivaudu sittenkään kävelemään kauemmas kuin lähimmälle kioskille. Saan arabirieskaa, syön sen kera halwaa, rahkaa ja hilloa. Kaverit kioskissa naurahtavat astuessani sisään. Kumma ajnabee, ulkomaanelävä, on näemmä saapunut takaisin.
Kävelen ulos kaupasta ja kiertelen korttelin ympäri yrittäen löytää rummutuksen lähteen. Se kaikuu kerrostaloista sinne tänne ja löydän talon, jossa lienee käynnissä jonkinlaiset juhlat vasta hetken maleksittuani.
Katselen keittiön ikkunasta, autot tööttäilevät Hafez al-Assadin motarilla, kaupunki ja minareettien vihreä hehku siellä täällä. Tympäisevää. Olen jo kerran lähtenyt täältä, olen jättänyt nämä näkymät, pidin niistä, mutta ei tämä ollut koti, eksoottista ja väliaikaista vain. Olla uudelleen täällä on vain tympäisevää, en osaa innostua samalla tavoin kuin aiemmin.
On vaikea innostua Syyriasta uudelleen. Olen täällä vain tekemässä työn eikä sekään ole kovin kiehtovaa. Lueskelen matkakirjaa Jemenistä, haluisin sinne pian, täällä on niin yksinäistä.