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El Blog!, Touppi's Super Eleet Blog.
Tuomas Toivonen
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Sun, 30 Jul 2006
Israel halts air strikes, what about the Katyushas?
According to Reuters Israel has acquiesced to a two day cessation of air strikes. Depressing that it was necessary to have a tragedy in Qana once again. But had this worst hit of the war happened elsewhere it wouldn't have carried to same strong symbolic meaning and perhaps not forced the Israelis to compromise.
However, forty eight hours is a very short period of time indeed. The security council will undoubtedly convene and must hammer together a convincing resolution. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, resolution 1559 will be reiterated. Hezbollah must disarm, Lebanese army to be deployed in the south and a "robust" international force organized to assist the army. A prisoner exchange should also happen. The Israelis will not accept anything less.
I am not feeling very optimistic. Isreal wanted to have ten to fourteen days to "finish the operation". What would that have entailed? More bombardment of the south. More civilian casualties as there is no easy way out of the villages in the south. Before the announcement of a halt in air strikes Israel had warned the residents of two villages in the south of imminent strikes. In a show of astonishing arrogance the Isrealis had been demanding the UN evacuate the residents of the villages before sunset. Considering the lack of care the IDF showed towards the UN last Tuesday in Khiam, it is no wonder that Annan promptly retorted with a "no way".
No aerial bombardment, but what will the IDF do then? Certainly they will not stand idle while Hezbollah continues with rockets. More rockets were launched today at Israel than on any day before. Extending ground operations within Lebanon seems out of the question for the IDF. After several bloody days of combat around Bint Jbeil resulted in a failure of the IDF to secure the city and in a retreat on Saturday, it doesn't seem likely they would take on Hezbollah at close quarters. Seeing that the internal debate within Israel has been growing critical of the abilities of the IDF to achieve destruction of Hezbollah (at least with current tactics), it is conceivable that Israel would give diplomacy a chance.
Again, I am not optimistic. Hezbollah's capabilities have probably not been significantly impaired and thus they have little incentive to stop rocketing south of the border. Unless the diplomatic efforts achieve a breakthrough and an agreement with Hezbollah by Wednesday, the IDF will commence with increased vigor and bomb southern Lebanon to cincers. Nothing much else they can do.
Everything now depends on Hezbollah. What was Hezbollah expecting on the 12th of July when they launched their crossborder assault? A simple prisoner exchange to bolster their standing as champions of pan-Arabism and as the arch enemy of Isreal; after all, can't let Hamas and Khaled Meshaal steal the show. If Hezbollah was not counting on an all out war with the IDF, they might be ready to cease hostilities. What would be needed then would be a reshaping of internal Lebanese politics.
Hezbollah as a political party is less significant than Hezbollah as a guerrilla force executing its own foreign policy at the expense of the Lebanese state. By engaging in violent geopolitics Hezbollah can force its hand in Lebanese politics and effectively holds a veto. Hezbollah upends the doctrine of war as an extension of politics. With its wargames it plays the worn out "undermine the state in order to bolster your sectarian interests" routine. Since the cedar revolution and ousting of the Syrians, it is Hezbollah that has refused the return to a pre-1976 pluralism, fragile though that might have always been.
I can't see Hezbollah disarming except if it can be reborn as a bona fide political party sans militia, but with significantly increased political influence. An overdue deconfessionalisation of the Lebanese electoral system would achieve this. On the short term sectarian interests of the Shiite would gain. Longer term one might hope for a truly deconfessionalized system where parties are formed around issues and ideologies that cut through sectarian boundaries. Nasrallah has claimed that it is not the aim of Hezbollah to mold Lebanon into an Iranian style Hezbollahstan. Maybe Hezbollah could indeed function as a constructive actor in a liberal democratic system. If not, then it doesn't seem possible for Mount Lebanon and Hezbollahstan to coexist within one sovereign state.